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ABSTRACT
Transitional countries where authoritarian features have long been
embedded in state institutions and policies face several challenges
that limit their ability to meet the expectations of citizens regarding
their rights. This article focuses on the development of human
rights in transitional Egypt between 2011 and 2013. It illustrates
how political actors perceive and critique the establishment of
the legal and institutional framework regarding human rights
protection, including constitution-making and transitional justice
processes, providing evidence from insights obtained from semi-
structured interviews with Egyptian political actors and the
analysis of secondary sources. The article demonstrates that the
uprisings in 2011 and subsequent developments during the SCAF
and Morsi governments show the failure of political actors to
protect Egyptians’ rights and meet the demands of the citizens
with regard to social justice, economic opportunities, freedom,
and dignity. It illustrates that weak or failing institutional
capacities, an exclusive approach in establishing an institutional
framework, lack of knowledge and experience concerning human
rights protection, and the authoritarian features of state
institutions strongly affected the promotion and protection of
human rights in post-uprising Egypt.
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New era of human rights in Egypt after the 2011 uprising
Hopes for a democratic transition in Egypt after the 2011 uprisings were short-lived, with
Egypt reverting to its authoritarian structures following the military coup in 2013. Con-
trary to the hopes and expectations of the Egyptian protesters demanding change from
Mubarak’s authoritarian regime, the human rights situation in Egypt did not improve
under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)1 or under the leadership of
Egypt’s only democratically elected president, MohamedMorsi. The reports and position
papers issued by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)2 as well a joint
statement signed by the Arab Network for Human Rights Information, the Egyptian
Initiative for Personal Rights, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, and the
Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights pointed to the worsening human
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rights situation in Egypt during Morsi’s rule, particularly concerning the right to peaceful
assembly, women’s rights, and the rights to freedom of belief, freedom of the press, and
freedom of association.3 Following the military coup in 2013, international independent
human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
published alarming reports about systematic human rights violations in Egypt.4 Accord-
ing to Human Rights Watch, Egypt has been experiencing its worst human rights crises
in many decades since the coup in 2013. The authoritarian rule of the Sisi government
has been entrenched through the suppression of fundamental freedoms while systemati-
cally committing grave human rights violations such as torture and enforced disappear-
ances against protesters from all backgrounds. Egyptians have been facing
institutionalised and systematic violations of human rights embedded in the procedures,
policies, laws, or objectives of state policies and institutions. In particular, the nation-
wide state of emergency, in place since April 2017, gives security forces unchecked
powers to suppress the fundamental freedoms of Egyptians.5
Human rights and democracy are assumed to be inherently compatible,6 having a
fundamental connection7 and being mutually constitutive.8 As respect for human
rights is necessary to succeed in the struggle for democratisation, the international
community and domestic policymakers aim at improving human rights in transitional
countries.9 The positive development of human rights depends on the creation of
certain state institutions and laws, and the implementation of particular state policies
leads to increased enjoyment of human rights. Several elements are necessary to
promote human rights, including international treaty commitments, constitutional
guarantees, and institutional frameworks. Internationally recognised human rights
also impose obligations on states10 and forbid them from taking any measures that
result in the violation of a given right through either their organs or their agents.11
Moreover, states must enact laws, develop capacities, invest financial resources,
implement policies, and develop institutions capable of fulfilling positive obligations.
However, states face several obstacles that limit their ability to meet the previously
mentioned obligations, such as lack of financial resources, weak or failing capacities,
misinterpreted or flawed laws, lack of will and commitment among political actors,
and lack of knowledge about successful human rights activities and strategies.12
Notably, in transitional countries where authoritarian features have long been
embedded in state institutions and policies, political actors may tend to uphold
those authoritarian features and hesitate to reform the institutional and legal frame-
work to pave the way for improving human rights practices.13
This article illustrates the development of human rights in post-uprising Egypt
between 2011 and 2013, focusing on how political actors from that period perceived
the issue of human rights in the course of the establishment of the institutional frame-
work, including constitution-making processes and transitional justice. Egypt is a
strong case from which to gain valuable insights into the dynamics of the development
of human rights in post-uprising countries because of its long history of authoritarianism
and because of its struggle for a transition following the uprisings in 2011. The focus on
the constitution-making process and transitional justice is of utmost importance as tran-
sitional processes mainly involve a revision of the constitution and application of transi-
tional justice mechanisms.14 The influence of international actors and institutions on
constitutional processes has a long history,15 and after the 1990s, international assistance
2 M. SARAL
for constitution-making in post-conflict crises particularly intensified and institutiona-
lised.16 Many different actors including states, academics, international organisations,
and advocacy groups offer assistance during the constitution-making process.17 The
current constitution-making processes in the MENA region following the 2011 upris-
ings have also generated demand for outside assistance.18 As constitutions symbolise a
departure from past authoritarian systems, the transitional country’s constitutional fra-
mework is expected to incorporate the international standards of rule of law and
human rights protection.19 Constitutions define the relationship between the nation’s
people and their government, impose constraints upon the government to protect indi-
viduals from abusive state actions, and draw from international law to provide a nor-
mative basis for the transformation rooted in existing principles of international law.20
Constitution-making processes are linked to the discourse of transition,21 and the con-
stitutional drafting processes and related negotiating processes are among the critical
factors of success or defeat of the transitional process. Egypt’s constitution-making
processes deserve special attention as Islamic parties were allowed and participated
in the constitutional process for the first time, which simultaneously signalled the
recognition of the supremacy of the law. However, Egypt’s opposing parties and insti-
tutions, including the military and both secular and Islamist actors, were not able to
build a consensus as they preferred to protect their interests, which in turn caused a
return to authoritarianism22 during the constitution-making process, with foreign
organisations being shut out.23 In addition to an inclusive constitution-making
process, transitional justice is expected to contribute positively to establishing rule of
law and protection of human rights in transitional countries and catalysing a
reclamation of societies in political and social dysfunction.24 Post-conflict countries
apply a wide range of mechanisms, including trials, truth-seeking mechanisms,
reparations (both material and symbolic), and administrative reforms to deal with
the past human rights violations committed under authoritarian rule, to prevent the
recurrence of violence, and to promote democratisation, the rule of law, and
reconciliation.25
Providing evidence obtained from semi-structured interviews with Egyptian political
actors from various political backgrounds, this article illustrates how the human rights
situation in the country and the approach of the SCAF and Morsi governments to
human rights issues in post-uprising Egypt were experienced by internal actors.
Fifteen semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2018 with Egyptian political elite
and civil society actors living abroad, mainly in Turkey, the UK, the USA, and
Canada, to give a detailed picture of human rights issues in transitional Egypt after
the uprisings according to political actors. Elite interviewees were selected based on
the snowballing technique, where an initial subset of interviewees of paramount
quality as political actors from different backgrounds were first identified based on
their relevance to the research topic. The interviews lasted for 1–1.5 h. All interviewees
provided written informed consent for their interviews to be audio recorded, data to
be used in this study, and names to be published. All interviewees were asked the
same open-ended questions to explain the human rights developments in post-uprising
Egypt and all interviews were conducted in English. The data collected were examined
and organised around key themes and central questions regarding the development of
human rights in transitional countries.
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Human Rights Challenges in post-Uprising Egypt
Egypt was one of the countries that played an essential role in helping draft the early UN
treaties that are integral to the contemporary human rights regime26 and made binding
international commitments to adhere to the standards of international human rights
norms; however, throughout their history, Egyptians have suffered the abuse of their fun-
damental rights at the hands of authoritarian rulers.27 The authoritarian rulers in Egypt
have disregarded or violated the international human rights treaties to which the country
is a state party and have negated the previously ratified treaties.28 The 2011 uprisings in
the MENA region caused significant expectations for tangible reforms and change in
authoritarian state policies. The ouster of the authoritarian Mubarak regime and free
and fair elections in Egypt gave the first positive signal for democratic transition in
the region and strengthened the hopes that post-authoritarian governments would
improve human rights in Egypt. However, the transitional process of Egypt, where
authoritarianism had long prevailed, could not meet these expectations, which is
reflected in Egypt’s rankings from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports,
which downgraded Egypt to ‘Not Free’ as of 2014.29
The term transition is primarily used to describe the political change from authoritar-
ian rule to democracy based on southern European and Latin American experiences.30
The Egyptian case shows, however, that the transitional processes of authoritarian
countries might not necessarily result in democracy and improvement of human
rights practices.31 The transitional processes following the uprisings in countries in the
MENA region proved to be open-ended processes of transformation providing a basis
for the strengthening of the authoritarian features of those countries and continued
human rights violations.32 In most cases, human rights violations in transitional
countries continue because international and domestic factors favouring the mainten-
ance of the institutional and legal frameworks causing human rights violations over-
whelm the international and domestic factors favouring the establishment of
institutional and legal frameworks to improve human rights.33 Transitional countries
face numerous human rights challenges and in most cases the government lacks the
capacity rather than the willingness to end human rights violations and address their
economic, political, or cultural root causes.34 The fundamental issue of human rights vio-
lations in transitional countries is related to the change and continuity in actors, insti-
tutional frameworks, and mentalities and attitudes. Current transitional issues need to
be addressed considering what has been inherited from the past authoritarian system
and what can be changed. When transitional countries address the issue of human
rights, they focus primarily on present and future conditions to assure the protection
of human rights, ignoring the question of what has been inherited from the past author-
itarian regime. This approach endangers the achievement of integrated human rights
protection in transitional countries. Moreover, the enclave of actors consisting of
groups, organisations, and sectors from the former authoritarian regime that may poten-
tially plot against the transitional process might challenge human rights protection in
transitional countries.35 In this context, the question of which actors are favoured by
the distribution of power during the transitional period is to be considered. Transitional
processes are prone to the arrival of new actors to the political scene and struggles to
isolate political actors from the past authoritarian regime from the political scene. The
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ideological background and objectives of newly rising actors as well the degree of the con-
tinuing influence of political actors from the past regime on the transitional period are
very much decisive in the success of the transition from the past authoritarian regime
to a more democratic system and in the improvement of human rights. In Egypt, the
rise of Islamist actors and the electoral victories of Islamist parties impacted the transi-
tional process. The election of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi in June 2012
as president of Egypt and the establishment of Islamist parties as critical players in the
transition created new internal divisions and disagreements that significantly impacted
the process of transformation of the institutional and legal framework in the region.36
The opposing actors in Egypt could not reach a compromise and that led the Egyptian
transitional process to failure.37
Human rights and the strengthened position of the Egyptian military
The Egyptian military has been the most significant pillar of the Egyptian regime since
1952 and acted as the ultimate guarantor of the regime in 1977, 1981, and 1986. It has
held a privileged position in the state, enjoying considerable prestige in society and
far-reaching autonomy in allocating its own budget. The Egyptian military possesses a
strong sense of corporatism and professionalism and has wide-ranging administrative
responsibilities in the state apparatus and in securing borders.38 Furthermore, it controls
several commercial businesses, including those in civilian sectors such as energy, food
and consumer goods production, tourism, and medical services.39
Because of this privileged position, the military was a key player during the uprisings
and in the transitional period that followed.40 The Egyptian transitional process has been
severely impacted by the ability of actors from the authoritarian past to influence the
country’s transformation. As Sultany points out, the country’s counter-revolution
started simultaneously with the revolutionary developments and co-existed with
them.41 Sultany underlines the dialectical character of the revolution process, in which
revolution and counter-revolution are intertwined. In this context, the counter-revolu-
tion in Egypt started immediately after the overthrow of Mubarak and had stabilising
and destabilising forms. In the first year, the army prioritised returning to a stable
order and the Muslim Brotherhood concurred. However, the army later allied with
former regime officials to stop the institutionalisation of the revolution, causing destabi-
lisation in turn. Several factors contributed to the strengthening of the counter-revolu-
tionary movements during the short-lived Morsi government, most notably the
existing political-economic order, the old organised networks of power, the inexperience
of the democratically elected Morsi government, and the disagreements of the protestors
on the nature of the new regime.42 The Egyptian military, judiciary, and security forces
actively contributed to the reproduction of Egypt’s pre-existing authoritarian framework
and gave rise to the worsening human rights in the country.43
The military, judiciary, and police tried to protect their own interests and privileged
positions, which were challenged after the uprisings by Muslim Brotherhood officials
and protesters.44 Post-uprising Egypt witnessed power struggles between the military
and civilians, which would come more strongly into prominence during critical
periods such as the constitution-making process. In this context, the military tried to
dominate the constitution-making process to ensure the continuation of its privileges.
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These efforts of the military are illustrated in the Silmi document, which aimed to safe-
guard the army’s privileges. The document gave the military financial autonomy and veto
rights over any legislation concerning military affairs, and it referred to the army as the
legitimate protector of the constitution.45 Some of the central institutions such as the par-
liament, political parties, and other gatekeepers were destabilised and collapsed during
the transitional period, whereas the military could maintain its coherence.46 The Egyp-
tian military could enforce its own political agenda by means of its strong position
within the state,47 which was further deepened by the post-uprising constitutions of
2012 and 2014.48
Although the Muslim Brotherhood carefully tried on the one hand to pacify the mili-
tary, on the other hand it was interested in achieving short-term political accomplish-
ments. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood pleased the military by confirming its special
and superior rights and putting it above public oversight and accountability in the
2012 constitution.49 Haitham Abu Khalil, an anchor with the Turkey-based satellite tele-
vision channel El-Sharq, pointed out in an interview I conducted in March 2018 that the
most extensive and the first mistake of the Morsi government was to allow the strong
influence of the military on the constitution of 2012.
In the initial stage of the uprisings in early 2011, the military leadership first decided to
observe the developments from a distance. However, the SCAF and Mubarak also called
upon the army to help restore order in the country. The first television statement from
the SCAF on 31 January 2011 declared that the army would not use force against the
people, except in cases of looting and other crimes, and its first communiqué, published
on 10 February 2011, proclaimed the support of the SCAF ‘for the legitimate demands of
the people.’50 Immediately after that, the SCAF took power and ousted Mubarak.51
Although a subsequent communiqué on 12 February 2011 declared Egypt’s commitment
to its regional and international obligations and treaties and stressed the necessity of the
rule of law for the freedom of the individual and the legitimacy of authority, on 30March,
a constitutional declaration was promulgated that unilaterally amended numerous
articles of the constitution52 to give the military wide-reaching, unchecked powers in
the executive and legislative spheres, strengthening its role in politics and threatening
the basic rights of the Egyptians.53 Moreover, the SCAF did not keep its initial
promise to revoke the state of emergency. Rather, it extended the application of the emer-
gency law, which included prohibitions against vaguely defined actions such as spreading
false information and calling for or participating in strikes or demonstrations.54 The
widespread use of military courts to try demonstrators for even ordinary crimes
such as theft and violence further negatively affected the human rights situation
during the SCAF rule in Egypt. The number of civilian cases brought before the mili-
tary courts increased considerably during SCAF rule compared to the 30 years of
Mubarak’s rule.55 Under SCAF rule, more than 12,000 civilians were herded into mili-
tary courts for both ordinary criminal charges and for the political arrests of protesters
or critics of the military.56 Furthermore, during its rule, the SCAF used force against
demonstrators throughout the country, provoking massive demonstrations in mid-
November 2011 and forcing the SCAF to move the presidential elections forward to
June 2012. Although the SCAF allied itself with the Muslim Brotherhood for some
time and made some concessions and tactical moves such as putting Mubarak on
trial, it actually sought—from the very beginning—to capture absolute power and
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control over the country.57 Wael Qandil, a founding member of Elbaradei’s Consti-
tution Party and a journalist now based in London, expressed this with the following
words:
Also before the Morsi period, SCAF made declarations to stop the parliament, and the gov-
ernment was under siege from the first moment… everybody noticed from day one after
Mubarak was kicked out that the military was planning to come back. Unfortunately, we
taught wrongly that we can face them and that the people could stop them.58
Human rights and new actors on the Egyptian political scene
Following the uprisings, the countries in the MENA region experienced the rise of Isla-
mist actors. It is argued that Islamist actors had a political advantage in the post-uprising
period due to their organisational capacity, ideological hegemony, and strength in pro-
viding social services.59 More importantly, all these factors promoted the reputation of
the Islamists as competent, trustworthy, and suited for good governance, supporting
the electoral victories of Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia, and beyond. Due to their reputation
for good governance, Islamists have gained the support of religious and various political
groups comprising those least satisfied with the performance of the overthrown author-
itarian government.60 The Egyptian election in June 2012 also resulted in the appoint-
ment of an Islamist actor as president of Egypt, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Mohamed Morsi receiving 13.2 million votes (51.7 per cent of valid votes). Although
there were fears about the Islamisation of the country, the first free election of a president
was regarded as an opportunity to replace the old authoritarian political regime with a
regime based on democracy, rule of law, and respect for fundamental rights. Following
the elections, Morsi also declared: ‘Egypt is now a real civil state. It is not theocratic, it
is not military. It is democratic, free, constitutional, lawful, and modern.’61
The semi-structured interviews illustrate that opinions about the human rights situ-
ation and human rights protection under the Morsi government are quite mixed.
Although the majority of the interviewees stressed that there were no direct or intentional
violations under the short-lived Morsi government, they pointed to the failure of the gov-
ernment to promote and protect fundamental rights, mainly due to lack of experience
and will concerning human rights protection as well as the scarcity of institutional
capacities. The majority of civil society actors and oppositional political actors com-
plained about the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach, which was not in line with the expec-
tations of the Egyptians who had rebelled against the authoritarian rulers. The Muslim
Brotherhood’s joint work with officials and politicians from the former regime was par-
ticularly highly criticised and caused deep distrust among Egyptians who had hoped for a
positive change after the ouster of the old regime. The spokesman of the 6th of April
movement, Muhammad Kamal, illustrated the Muslim Brotherhood’s misguided
approach using the metaphor of an old house:
The members of Muslim Brotherhood are not revolutionary people. They do not believe in
revolution, they believe in making things better step by step, but this approach is very wrong
during a revolutionary period. We were in a revolution, we destroyed the gate of the old
state, which is Mubarak; we refused to leave Tahrir Square on 11 February, but they insisted
we leave it… you know, if this is your house, and this is a very old house, you can’t live in it,
because it is very dangerous, it can break down… Egypt was like that. But when we said this
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 7
to them, they said to us, no, it is a very beautiful house. We will make a carpet, we will buy a
TV, we will buy chairs, we will buy furniture and we will live here… They did not believe in
us when we said that this house must be destroyed and rebuilt again… I am sure that if the
Brotherhood listened to our advice and our warnings, we would not have all these [pro-
blems]. When they appointed Sisi as Minister of Defence, we rejected that, and we said
that he was the head of the military intelligence, he is responsible for the killings of many
people… So for this period we cannot say that the Muslim Brotherhood violated human
rights or they were the reason for the killings, but the people who supported SCAF and
Mubarak made campaigns to fail the country.62
These criticisms were also partly shared by governmental politicians from the Morsi gov-
ernment period. When I asked Amr Darrag, the Minister of Planning and International
Cooperation for the Morsi government and the Secretary-General of the Assembly, what
the government should have done differently to avoid the crisis and the coup, he criti-
cised the weakness of the government in fulfilling the demands of the Egyptians:
You have to do what is right. People whom you know are corrupt or are against the revolu-
tion should be kept away. The main mistake was to work at a pace that was a pace for a
democracy and was not compatible with the revolutionary demands. When you are in a
transition, you have to make sure that you consider what were people complaining about,
what pushed them to revolution, and how to meet their demands.63
However, he also added—in their defence—that they were trying to establish the necess-
ary institutions to stop the anti-revolutionary forces, but he agreed that the outcome
proved that this was not the right approach for the revolutionary period:
The Brotherhood was just trying to focus on one thing, which is establishing institutions,
mainly the constitution, the parliament, the presidency through elections and democracy.
So they were trying to avoid any other minor issues and the objections of some people to
pass this critical period of having these establishments. The idea was that if we manage, if
the Brotherhood, with the help of the Egyptian people, manages to establish elected insti-
tutions, this would create the buffer against the anti-revolution, but it turned out that this
concept was not the proper one at that time.64
Institutionalisation of human rights protection during the Morsi
government
Constitutions, as the highest legal and political act, define the relationship between the
nation’s people and their government and impose constraints upon the government to
protect individuals from abusive state actions. The actual influence of constitutions on
human rights protection, however, might be limited and dependent on many factors,
such as regime type, economic development, and population size.65 Moreover, the pro-
motion of human rights requires more than drafting rights in a constitution, including
the state’s commitment to protecting human rights, the promotion of an individual’s
awareness of these rights, and enhancement of the state’s administrative infrastructure.66
The constitution-making process is particularly worth analysing in transitional countries
because the ways in which constitutions are made, discussed, and implemented are deci-
sive in the durability and stability of an established institutional framework.67
The Egyptian constitution-writing process is essential to explore because it was not
simply an act of framing citizen rights in a written document; it was a discursive platform
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and a decisive landmark where various political actors tried to voice their interests.
However, in Egypt, the most critical aspect of human rights protection, namely establish-
ing a well-equipped administrative infrastructure to ensure the correct implementation
of all laws, was neglected. One can say that the Egyptians were, to some extent, able to
include fundamental rights in the constitution in line with international human rights
law, but they could not establish the necessary supervisory organs for assessing compli-
ance with legal obligations.68 In this context, the majority of the individuals I interviewed
—not only the oppositional actors but also the supporters of the Morsi government—
pointed to the negligence of the Morsi government in establishing a transitional
justice committee, which would have been a vital institution in post-uprising Egypt con-
cerning human rights protection and would in turn have positively contributed to the
transitional process of the country. The transitional justice process is vital for a successful
transition as its mechanisms do not only help post-conflict societies address large-scale
past abuses and ensure accountability and serve justice. They also have psychological
aspects and healing powers in establishing truth, educate the public about the nature
of past abuses, and help to reinforce moral norms.69 In this regard, transitional justice,
which was one of the most important mechanisms of the success of the Tunisian post-
uprising transitional period (although the process was stopped by political figures
from the Ben Ali era), was not facilitated in Egypt and the possibility of serving
justice, achieving reconciliation, and healing past wounds was missed. The failure to
establish a transitional justice process was criticised by several interviewees in the
context of human rights development in post-uprising Egypt. The spokesman of the
6th of April movement, Muhammad Kamal, illustrated the approach of Morsi’s govern-
ment concerning transitional justice:
They did not neglect it, but they did not want the revolution to spread…Many people were
killed and put in prison for tens of years during the Mubarak era. They refused all the pro-
posals. We as a movement had a proposal for a law project on transitional justice, and we
proposed this to the Muslim Brotherhood; they refused…Now the Muslim Brotherhood is
calling for transitional justice. Why? Because their members were killed, they were forced to
leave, they were in danger, but in the past, the danger was not only directed to them but to all
the Egyptians.70
However, the transitional government cited the limited period of its rule, which was
dominated by severe crises and powerful actors from the former regime, as the reason
for its failure to meet the protesters’ demands, particularly concerning human rights.
Politicians from Morsi’s government refuted the criticisms of their negligence in estab-
lishing an institutional and legal framework and pointed to their efforts to establish the
necessary institutions. For instance, Oussama Rusdhi noted the following:
We made recommendations to make amendments to the law on the National Council for
human rights, the law number 94, to increase the authority of the council under the Paris
Regulation for the National Council for Human Rights. We were at the last step before
the military coup.71
Oussama Rusdhi also pointed to his efforts and the disinterest of the government in
establishing a transitional justice committee like that in Tunisia, explaining:
I was very interested in transitional justice; I led the project to create a committee for transi-
tional justice within the National Council for Human Rights. I talked several times with my
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colleagues to convince them about this. On the first of May, we agreed to create the transi-
tional justice committee, and we cooperated with the Minister of Justice, universities, and
NGOs to prepare the transitional justice law… I was one of the first people who prepared
a transitional justice program. I had a meeting with Morsi. I gave himmy project on an inde-
pendent committee for truth and justice and explained transitional periods from various
countries. However, the members of Brotherhood are not revolutionary people. They
thought opening a new page with the military is a good way… I also spoke several times
with the chairman of the National Council for Human Rights about facilitating a transitional
justice process as in Tunisia, but his point of view was that this job is more extensive than
our ability. I tried hard because transitional justice was one of the primary responsibilities of
this council.72
Similarly, Wael Qandil pointed to the intervention of the old regime and security forces
in the process of transitional justice and illustrated how they stopped the protection of
victims’ rights:
With regard to the victims of revolution, we were very concerned with showing the fact-
finding report. Morsi signed this and ordered to publish it, but the old regime and police
prevented it. If they let it be published and to work, its results should make a very nice
atmosphere, everybody would feel relaxed. That was the main problem… victims’ rights
were neglected… I am sure that these issues touched Dr. Morsi, but they did not allow,
or they did not let any time for him to work on human rights problems.73
Furthermore, the Egyptian constitution-making process was not successful in producing
consensus when compared with the constitution-making process of Tunisia, and this
problem deepened the polarisation and division in Egyptian society, undoubtedly nega-
tively affecting the actual influence of the constitution on human rights protection.
During constitution-making processes, the questions of who will be included in the draft-
ing process and how the negotiations will be structured are vital.74 As the constitution-
making process in transitional countries is a contested one, these questions become more
urgent and pressing. Constitutions are stamped by and illustrate the interests of the
actors responsible for drafting and approving them. Thus, the degree of the inclusiveness
of the drafting and approval stages of a constitution is a decisive factor for the duration
and strength of the constitution.75 Research shows that the inclusiveness of a consti-
tution-making process is very much decided by the extent of ideological polarisation
of society. The more polarised a society is, the narrower the range of factions represented
during the constitution-making process will be. The inclusiveness of a constitution-
making process also impacts its ability to constrain the government and the extent of
rights provisions and better enforcement mechanisms.76
As in Tunisia, the ideological polarisation in Egypt was between secular and Islamist
actors debating the role of religion in the legal and political system, giving rise to the
exclusion of liberals by the Muslim Brotherhood. In Tunisia, too, the dominant actors
after the ouster of Ben Ali were Islamists who mainly favoured a more significant
influence of religion in politics. However, the Tunisian constitution-making process,
in contrast to the Egyptian process, is primarily described as a constant search by all
parties for consensus, during which Ennahda also made many concessions regarding
the previously accepted ideologies for the sake of consensus,77 such as renouncing any
mention of Sharia in the constitution and accepting the inclusion of women’s ‘equality’
and the right to freedom of conscience and belief in the constitution.78 Ghannouchi
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played a key role in facilitating these concessions during the constitution-making process
and was able to convince the Ennahda members of the merits of reaching a consensus
among different ideological parties during the transitional period,79 which caused a
smoother constitution-making process in Tunisia compared to Egypt. Omar Ashour
argues that a theologically knowledgeable and credible religious leader could handle
the deradicalisation process of Islamists and convince them to make concessions.80
Ghannouchi’s efforts during the constitution-making process to reach a consensus and
to convince the party members to make some concessions were beneficial for the peaceful
constitution-making process in Tunisia. However, in Egypt, Morsi lacked the above-
mentioned qualities of charismatic leadership to handle the deradicalisation process of
Islamist group members, which negatively influenced the development and outcome
of the Egyptian constitution-making process.
As already mentioned, Islamists were the winners of the 2012 elections in Egypt, where
the Freedom and Justice Party (a political party stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood
movement) and the Salafist Nour Party received about 70 per cent of the seats in the par-
liament. The 2011 Constitutional Declaration of the SCAF required that the constitution
be drafted by 100 members chosen by the parliament. As the Islamists had the majority of
the seats in the parliament, the constituent assembly to draft the constitution was also
dominated by the Islamists. Although the first constitutional assembly was declared
unconstitutional by the State Council in April 2012 because half of its members had
been chosen within the legislative assembly,81 the following assembly selected in June
was also dominated by Islamists and 66 of 100 members of Egypt’s constituent assembly
were Islamists, associated with the Muslim Brotherhood or Al Nour Party. Therefore, the
concerns of secular actors were high regarding the establishment of their interests in the
new constitution of the country.82
The tension between the secular and Islamist actors grew continuously during the
constitution-making process, and debates on the role of religion in the constitution,
religious minority rights, and women’s rights exacerbated the conflict.83 The compo-
sition of the assembly was rejected by secular and oppositional parties and the exclu-
sion of the opponents caused such a deep polarisation that Christian, socialist, and
liberal members of the two constituent assemblies formed during 2012 walked out
to protest the dominance of Islamists in the assembly.84 At the same time, several
secular parties were threatening to establish a parallel constituent panel to draft a
new constitution.85 The judiciary tried to adjust the composition of the constituent
assembly, which was met with decrees by the Morsi administration. The Supreme Con-
stitutional Court declared the law organising a second constituent assembly unconsti-
tutional but underlined at the same time that this declaration did not pose a challenge
to the validity of the constitution as it was approved by the people in referendum.86
The failure of the leading political institutions to define the rules of the consti-
tution-making process and the centrality of the military were major institutional
factors in Egypt that negatively impacted the outcome of Egypt’s constitution-
making process.87 However, the exclusivist approach of the Morsi government in com-
posing the constitutional assembly further worsened the situation, making a consensus
between different parties almost impossible and profoundly influencing the consti-
tution-making process. The composition of the committee drafting the constitution,
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as a successive, closed, and non-public body, is mainly held responsible for the dee-
pened polarisation in Egypt.
However, Amr Darrag refuted these criticisms of the composition of the constitutional
committee, stating that the composition of the committee was manipulated by the
counter-revolutionary strategies of the SCAF:
Actually, there was an initial attempt to formulate the assembly based on the represen-
tation in the parliament and with the participation of some of the parliament members,
and the constitution of this assembly more or less reflected percentages of the political
masses inside the parliament, but many people didn’t like that. They said that consti-
tution-writing is different from a parliamentary process and everybody has to be rep-
resented, and if we give the majority ‘to Islamists’ they will control everything. So,
the Islamists accepted these arguments and the first assembly was dissolved, and
another one—with the basic agreement of everybody involved—was reached. We
knew later that the SCAF was trying to ruin the process of forming this assembly.
Of course, SCAF was interested during this time… to establish their authority from
behind the scene and give themselves undisputable power regardless of what is in the
constitution.88
Mohamed Gamal Heshmat, a former parliamentarian and a prominent leader of the
Muslim Brotherhood, further described the constitution-making process in 2012 as an
inclusive one, comparing it to the 2014 constitution as follows: ‘2012 constitutions
were discussed by the specialists and university members. However, the 2014 consti-
tution was not discussed by anybody. Only 51 members, which were chosen by a military
investigation, made the constitution, and even this constitution is not respected by the
military.’89
One of the most controversial issues during the constitution-making process, as men-
tioned above, was how to balance the interests of Islamist and secular actors, and this
issue was mirrored in the debate about the place of Sharia in the constitution, which
in turn concerned the protection and promotion of human rights in the country.90
The principles of Sharia as a main source of legislation were introduced for the first
time in Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution of 11 September 1971. In its 1980 Consti-
tution, Egypt amended Article 2 and made Sharia the main source of legislation rather
than a main source of legislation. This amendment of Sharia from a principal source
to the principal source was interpreted as meaning that all law must be in conformity
with Islamic law.91 However, this was only a symbolic gesture92 and actually produced
no radical changes in terms of the previous legislation.93 The question of the role of
the principles of Sharia as a major source of legislation acquired renewed importance
in political debates in Egypt following the January revolution.94 Particularly important
is the new provision with regard to the position of Sharia, Article 219, which states
that ‘the principles of Islamic Sharia include its general evidence and its fundamental
and doctrinal rules, as well as its sources considered by schools of the People of tradition
and consensus.’ This was regarded critically, as it potentially limited the power of the
Supreme Constitutional Court in defining the term ‘Sharia principles’ as formulated in
Article 2.95
The approach of the Muslim Brotherhood during the constitution-making process,
wherein it reached no consensus and placed no importance on establishing the insti-
tutions vital for the protection of human rights, was one of the main hindrances to
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the development of human rights in transitional Egypt. In this regard, Morsi’s govern-
ment was criticised by political actors for appointing only its own supporters regardless
of their experience in the field or qualifications to fulfil their responsibilities. Wael Qandil
expressed this as follows:
With regard to the Human Rights Council, they did the same, they selected some people
who were supporting Ikhwan, and they didn’t have any experience. They didn’t know
how to work on human rights. They never needed this before. They did not have any
skills or experience.96
As outlined here, the main failure of the government was that it did not heed its obli-
gations to establish the necessary institutional framework foreseen by the constitution
as essential for the promotion of human rights.
The polarised constitution-making process in 2012, which constrained the partici-
pation of oppositional voices and excluded different groups, resulted in a constitution
that consolidated the influence of religion and military in politics and strengthened
the executive branch of the government. More importantly, the controversial process
gave rise to violent protests and caused the military coup of July 2013. That coup, in
turn, led to Morsi’s ouster and a serious backsliding in the transitional process. Under
the military government, constitutional institutions were weakened and institutionalised
human rights violations became state policy.97 As described above, throughout the
history of Egypt, the military has enjoyed a privileged position and has been at the
centre of the political scene. However, after the coup, the military achieved an absolute
power gain, enabling it to impose its own political agenda and shape the country’s pol-
itical outcomes. The legitimacy of the military was also strengthened by the difficulties of
the transitional period from 2011 to 2013. The failure of Morsi’s government to address
the structural problems that generated the uprisings in 2011 and the citizens’ expec-
tations of a better socio-economic situation and improved security not only strengthened
the legitimacy of the military but also led to the election of army leader Abdel Fattah Al-
Sisi as president in 2014, against the backdrop of brutal repression of the Muslim Broth-
erhood. In the context of the military coup and the high degree of exhaustion in Egyptian
society, the military government was able to demobilise the Egyptian political space.98
The Sisi government appointed a commission of experts in charge of drafting a new
constitutional text that was approved by referendum in January 2014.99 This new consti-
tution was described by the interviewees as a good constitution or even as much better
than the first constitution with regard to human rights. Amr Darrag, for instance, con-
sidered the constitution of the Sisi government—concerning human rights—to be better
than the constitution of the Morsi government. He stated in our interview that:
There is not much difference when it comes to the basic rights and freedoms. Some articles
are even better in the new constitution. Of course, there are some issues related to the mili-
tary, which are the main concerns. The military tried to push through the constitution-
making process… and managed to push what it was interested in. It even secured the
immunity for the position of Minister of Defence… The main impact of human rights is
not related to the articles in the constitution, but it is related to their practice… For instance,
according to the Constitution of 2014 and 2012 torture is a crime, but nobody respects this
constitutional article. The constitution is treated like toilet paper. This is the main
problem.100
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13
Khalaf Bouyami, an Egyptian lawyer and the manager of the Alshahab Human Rights
Center, also compared the two constitutions with the following words:
Regarding the content of both constitutions, there are no big differences between 2012 and
2014 constitutions. Essentially the 2014 constitution of the coup is full of human rights pro-
visions, which are very good. More than 14 provisions are talking about human rights. So,
the point is, it is not relevant if the constitution has specific provisions about human rights,
if these provisions are not applied. Actually, nothing from this constitution is applied… for
example, the right to life, 1000 Egyptians were killed, violating the most fundamental right
of Egyptians.101
Thus, the constitution could not secure the protection of human rights, as the govern-
ment intentionally neglected its obligations concerning human rights protection and
institutionalised human rights violations to secure its power over citizens. Accordingly,
Sisi’s government ignored Article 241 of the constitution on transitional justice, which
required the parliament to issue a transitional justice law in its first session that
‘ensures revealing the truth, accountability, proposing frameworks for national reconci-
liation, and compensating victims, in accordance with international standards.’However,
the parliament choose to protect the officials accused of severe human rights violations
and disregarded this obligation.102
Following the military coup, Egyptians experienced very aggressive forms of human
rights violations. The interviewees mainly described this period as incomparable to
any other period in the history of Egypt and illustrated the human rights violations as
a tool of the post-coup government to create fear and gain absolute control over the
state. Maha Azzam, the president of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council, described
this atmosphere in the following words:
If you ask Egyptians or members of the Brotherhood who have experienced incarcerations
in the past, they will say that the level of human rights violations is unprecedented. All these
features are features of an extremely revengeful regime. This regime is particularly revenge-
ful. I think because it is a regime that has been seriously challenged. They want to ensure that
January 25th and that uprising and the change will never happen again because they believe
that their own lives would be at risk.103
Similarly, Wael Qandil illustrated how the Sisi government intentionally facilitated mas-
sacres against the demonstrators:
They make massive penalties against these people, by the court, by police, hundreds of
people have been killed by judges. Why did they make Rabia like this in a very dirty
way? They wanted to end the power of people asking for change. They send this message
to the people. So they intentionally made Rabia a massacre, it was not by luck, no, it was
decided to make a lake of blood, to make an example for everyone who thinks about pro-
testing the regime.104
With the legislature having been dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court, presi-
dent Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was free to issue several laws and decrees targeting NGOs, jour-
nalists, and public protests that undermined the fundamental rights and freedoms of
Egyptians.105 The institutions that were supposed to protect human rights in Egypt
became tools in the hands of the government to systematically abuse the rights of citizens.
To punish the opponents of the government and strengthen its rule, the military inten-
sively repressed independent voices, including those of NGOs and the media. Security-
14 M. SARAL
sector institutions (the military, police, and intelligence services), which are accountable
only to the president, have been fiercely violating the human rights guaranteed to Egyp-
tian citizens in the constitution.106
As a result, concerning human rights, during the period following the coup, Egyptians
experienced severe violations of their fundamental rights and freedoms. The interviewees
pointed out that human rights violations have been an issue throughout Egypt’s history
because of the country’s authoritarian regimes. However, after the coup, the nature of
violations changed in terms of their quantity, range, objectives, and victims. The viola-
tions were widespread and targeted all opponents of the regime, without any borders
or red lines. The goal was absolute control of citizens through systematic and institutio-
nalised human rights violations. The changing nature of human rights violations after the
coup was described by Maha Azzam as follows:
Essentially, we had a dictatorship in Egypt for 60 years; the only time during which that was
reversed was in 2012 under President Morsi’s government. The coup of July 3, 2013, was a
blatant act of violence, which was, from the very beginning, an act of open violence against
citizens… I don’t want go into detail about that, but what you have is a systematic act
against citizens, who were protesting or seemed to be protesting non-violently. This was
obviously accompanied by detentions, arrests in prisons, and the numbers escalated from
the hundreds to thousands to the tens of thousands… The whole issue of forced disappear-
ances is again a feature that has become associated somewhat with the coup. I think another
is the systematic resort to torture. Yes, the Egyptian prisoners were tortured particularly
under Nasser and even after that, but I think it is the systematic level of torture… the
denial of visits, the denial of medication, the systematic use of what people referred to as
slow death.107
Conclusion
The uprisings in 2011 and subsequent developments show a failure of political actors to
promote and protect the human rights of Egyptians and to meet their expectations. Semi-
structured interviews conducted with political actors illustrate that from the very begin-
ning, the counter-revolutionary forces tried to gain the upper hand and control of Egyp-
tian politics by fiercely violating human rights and/or neglecting the demands of the
protesters. In this context, not only military governments but also the short-lived
Morsi government were unable to meet the expectations of Egyptians. Interviewees
pointed to the scarcity of time and the influence of the military and other political
figures from the former authoritarian regime as the cause of the failure of the Morsi gov-
ernment in realising its goals on the one hand; on the other hand, they underlined that
human rights and meeting the demands of the protesters were not at the top of the Morsi
government’s agenda. Indeed, political actors from the Freedom and Justice Party were
inexperienced and lacked knowledge about human rights issues and transitional pro-
cesses; however, instead of compensating for the violation of human rights, they also pre-
ferred to make compromises with state actors, hoping for a smoother transition.
Moreover, the exclusivist approach of the Morsi government during the constitution-
making process constrained the participation of oppositional voices and different
groups in the process, resulting in strong polarisation of the country and a weak insti-
tutional framework regarding human rights protection. The military coup in 2013 fun-
damentally changed the political scene in Egypt, giving the military tremendous and
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absolute power that far surpassed the power of Egypt’s previous military governments.
The Egyptian case illustrates the significance of the continuity of actors in the transitional
process. Egyptian military and political actors from the Mubarak era played a critical role
in the failure of the transitional process in Egypt and turned Egypt into a more author-
itarian regime. Moreover, the failure of the political actors to build a political agreement
between the most significant opposing parties and institutions together with the negli-
gence of the application of transitional justice processes shifted the direction of the Egyp-
tian transition towards a more authoritarian regime, which in turn negatively affected the
development of human rights and gave rise to an extreme level of human rights viola-
tions. However, the interviews illustrate that the extreme level of human rights violations
also caused an extremely high level of awareness of human rights in post-uprising Egypt.
As human rights violations have reached unprecedented levels, with seemingly everyone
in Egypt being targeted, Egyptians have become more aware of their rights, even when
they cannot always speak loudly about them. This, perhaps, represents a small ray of
hope for the future possibility of better human rights protection in Egypt through
ongoing resistance against the repressive regime.
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